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AND NOW "THE DEREGULATORS":
WHEN WILL THEY LEARN?
FREDERICK C. THAYER*
T HIS JOURNAL published a symposium in 1975' on the con-
temporary effort to deregulate the airline industry. This article
might be labeled an answer to the question one author posed, "Air-
line Regulation-A Hoax?" My response is that "hoax" is a mild
word for what the advocates of deregulation are about, and this
article is an attempt to be both comprehensive and brief in ex-
plaining why. Because many who deal with air transport policy
ignore important aspects of airline history, misrepresent that his-
tory when they look at it, and completely disregard such important
problems as the aircraft manufacturing industry, it is a tall order
to be comprehensive without producing a giant volume. The at-
tempt is needed, however, because the drive for deregulation is
stronger now than it has been for some time; indeed, legislation
may have been passed by the time this appears in print.
I shall first attempt to outline the airline system the advocates
of deregulation seem to have in mind. In doing so, I shall argue
that we are presently the victim of abstract and illogical theories
attributable to classical economies, especially those of the most
fundamental subfield of that discipline-microeconomics, or the
economics of the marketplace. Drawing in part upon the work of
John Kenneth Galbraith I will outline why the intellectual separa-
tion of microeconomics and macroeconomics (capital flow, aggre-
* B.S., U.S. Military Academy; M.A., Ohio State Univ.; Ph.D., Univ. of Den-
ver. Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs,
Univ. of Pittsburgh.
141 J. AIR L. & COM. 573 (1975). Contributors were Roy Pulsifer, CAB
Special Staff, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, John W. Snow, David Heymsfeld,
James C. Miller III, Michael E. Levine, Lucile Sheppard Keyes, James W. Calli-
son, Melvin A. Brenner, Donald J. Lloyd-Jones, Raymond J. Rasenberger, and
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gate societal data) is disastrous when we deal with particular in-
dustries. With one exception, the behavior pattern of the airline
industry, one widely criticized, is no different than the behavior
pattern in any market system dominated by a few producers, re-
gardless of whether the industry is regulated or unregulated. Be-
cause prices are regulated, they are lower than prices in unregulated
industries, and lower than they would be under deregulation. I
then deal with the deregulators' insistence that the more closely
any market approaches "perfect" or "free" competition, the better
for consumers, arguing instead that price competition (as opposed
to service competition) is logically impossible and leads only to
social chaos when it occurs.
The second section takes up a peculiar variant of price competi-
tion, one widely favored when government agencies issue contracts
for specified services. Based upon my experience with the awarding
of contracts by the Department of Defense for airlift services by
civil carriers, I outline why competitive bidding systems are as
logically impossible as other designs involving price competition.
In making the argument, I retrace some widely misunderstood as-
pects of airline history and competitive bidding. The insistence
upon competitive bidding, whether for route awards or specific air-
lift requirements, can lead only to dangerous compromises in safety
and training. Further, those advocating widespread competitive
bidding do not seem to realize that such an approach requires the
constant availability of a pool of unemployed aircraft and crews.
Thirdly, I take up a problem usually overlooked when regulatory
policy is discussed. The history of the supplemental airlines is
often misrepresented, principally because analysts seldom study it
in detail. The supplementals are as much wards of the govern-
ment as any other carriers, if in slightly different ways. The govern-
ment used military contracts as incentives for the supplementals
to buy modern aircraft and, even if government reneged on its
commitments, it retains an implied responsibility for the carriers'
success. A closely related long-term policy has encouraged the sale
of as many U.S. air transports as possible (especially to foreign
carriers via loans guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank), on
grounds that the aircraft manufacturing industry is a necessary
mobilization base for -national preparedness. The result is that
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many more aircraft are available than are needed (at least in peace-
time), and this is the underlying cause of the demand for de-
regulation.
I conclude with the argument that nothing short of a "public
utility" system can possibly work, one which treats each city-pair
market as a monopoly operation. While this always has been the
case, the need for city-pair monopolies is now a social imperative
and, regardless of its advantages or disadvantages, is inevitable
because of the energy crisis already with us. Beyond that, however,
the record shows that public regulation of public utilities has been
more beneficial to consumers than any other type of market system.
This is admittedly a minority view, but I have no doubt the argu-
ment ultimately will prevail. It will prevail, that is to say, if anyone
ever seriously looks at it, instead of assiduously ignoring it, as
policy analysts have done for so many years.
Two MYTHS: THE "INEFFICIENCY" OF OLIGOPOLY AND THE
"EFFICIENCY" OF PRICE COMPETITION.
A logical place to begin is with an analysis of the premises of
those who favor deregulation, particularly those who contributed
to this journal's symposium. The statement, by James C. Miller,
II in the Journal of Air Law & Commerce Symposium can be
used to set the stage:
The theoretical argument for the efficiency of deregulated airline
markets is extremely powerful. The airline industry appears to con-
form closely to the necessary conditions for price competition:
no significant scale economies, fairly elastic (firm) demand, rela-
tive difficulty of co-ordinating pricing and output policies (that is,
collusion), and, in the absence of controls, relative ease of entry
and exit.'
This coincides with the assertion of the CAB Special Staff on
Regulatory Reform that "the industry is naturally competitive, not
monopolistic. In the absence of economic regulation, it is clear
that monopoly abuses would not occur."3 The CAB seeks to "en-
2Miller, A Perspective on Airline Regulatory Reform, 41 J. Am L. & CoM.
679, 690 (1975) (footnote omitted).
3 Report of the CAB Special Staff on Regulatory Reform: General Conclusion
and Principal Recommendations, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 601 (1975).
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courage greater efficiency through price competition."' Miller's
statement is also in line with John W. Snow's assertion that "since
there are not any significant economies of scale in the industry,
one would not expect any natural tendencies toward monopoly. The
entry restrictions have reduced the number of firms below the
number that would otherwise be effective competitors."' The report
of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure acknowledges that "in industries with only a few firms,
fear of immediate retaliation makes general price-cutting rare;
price floors are eroded only as firms each begin to make a few
selective price cuts in limited areas."' Snow admits that, "given the
oligopoly character of most airline markets and the monopoly
characteristics of many local service markets, relaxation of entry
is essential to police the pricing flexibility provisions of the pro-
posed Aviation Act."'
If we take these together, we see also a perfect representation
of the conventional wisdom of micro (market) economics. The
only forms of "competition" accepted as legitimate is all-out price
competition in a "free" market, one not dominated by a few pro-
ducers, but having so many producers that no single producer can
influence the market price. It follows, as the conventional wisdom
would have it, that competition can occur not only if we prevent
airline monopoly, but only if we prevent oligopoly, that is, a market
with few producers, as well. It follows, also, that the producers in
an oligopoly do not really compete with each other at all. To refute
the argument, then, I must deal with two questions which, I think,
fairly represent the issues at stake: ( 1 ) Do members of an oligopoly
compete with each other? and, (2) Is the all-out price competition
of a "free" market possible to attain, especially for the airlines?
I shall argue that (1) members of oligopolies, regulated or un-
regulated, do indeed compete fiercely against each other, but in
very expensive and wasteful ways; and that (2) all-out price com-
petition is logically impossible in any industry, never has worked,
and never can work.
4 Id. at 603.
'Snow, Aviation Regulation: A Time for Change, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 637,
664 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Snow].
'Kennedy, Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 41 J. Am L.
& CoM. 607, 621 (1975).
7 Snow, supra note 5, at 648.
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In making my argument, I ask the reader to keep in mind one
important aspect of airline operations, often obscured by air trans-
port policy analysts. The airline travel market is not one complex
market of sellers (airlines) and buyers (travelers), but it is a very
large number of individual markets, represented by the standard
phrase "city-pair." Whether national or international, passenger
or cargo, we deal with many individual markets, and when we
speak of the total number of companies in operation we should do
so with respect to specific city-pairs; it is not significant whether we
have ten, or twenty, or fifty carriers, but only how many carders
are providing service for a single market.
To deal with the question of oligopoly competition, I begin with
the overall phenomenon of oligopoly. One author defines oligopoly
as a market in which no more than four producers have an aggre-
gate market share of seventy per cent John Kenneth Galbraith
uses a standard of sixty per cent, noting that four firms dominate
aluminum, copper, rubber, cigarettes, soap and detergents, liquor,
glass, refrigerators, cellulose fibers, photographic equipment, cans,
computers, sugar, and many other items; three firms dominate
automobiles, with occasional challenges from a fourth.9 With little
change from administration to administration, government agencies
routinely accuse oligopolies of setting "artificially inflated prices."
To cite just one example, the Federal Trade Commission proposed
in 1972 to divest Kellogg, General Mills, General Foods, and
Quaker Oats Company of some or all their cereal-making facilities,
on grounds that a "competitively structured market" would lead
to a twenty to twenty-five per cent decrease in prices. Consumer
advocate Ralph Nader, long an advocate of more competition
among airlines, praised the FTC action as "one of the most import-
ant developments in the last decade.""
There is little doubt that members of an oligopoly set higher
prices and achieve larger profits than do the many producers in
8J. MCGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 126, ch. 8 (1971).
'J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971).
10 N.Y.Times, Jan. 25, 1972, 1, at 1, col. 4. In early 1977, supermarkets were
a target. One Congressional study concluded that because four chains controlled
76% of the grocery business in one city, monopoly overcharges amounted at $83
million per year. Pittsburgh Press, May 21, 1977, B, at 1. The new attorney gen-
eral was announcing a drive against "shared monopoly," the pejorative phrase for
oligopoly. TIME, May 23, 1977, at 71.
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a "free" market. Indeed, one airline analyst, Richard Caves, con-
cludes that profit rates are higher than normal any time eight or
fewer sellers control seventy per cent of a market" (I shall return
to this conclusion because of its significance to arguments about
airline deregulation). Oligopolies lead to higher prices for at least
three reasons, none of them ever mentioned by advocates of more
competition.
The first is best outlined in Galbraith's analysis of modern in-
dustry; he has for years pointed out the inherent contradictions of
our economic theories. Modem society and its associated tech-
nology are impossible without the planning and resources of large
organizational systems. Conventional microeconomists study the
market and conclude that problems of efficiency and performance
are aggravated by the dominance of a few producers who set high
prices. Macroeconomists study the economy as a whole, ignore the
workings of industry, and conclude that great strides have been
made. Prices are high, in part, because of the need to accumulate
"retained earnings" for investment in technology and expansion.
The minimum profits favored by advocates of free competition
would make this impossible, hence the subject never is mentioned.
Microeconomists, in other words, assume or imply that large
organizational systems are not necessary."
A second reason is a tacit agreement among producers that all-
out price competition must be avoided because it would drive some
producers out of business.' Government, despite its abstract sup-
port of price competition and its concrete support of airline de-
regulation, actually is a party to this tacit agreement. Government
emphatically opposes the inevitable result of price competition
when that result threatens to materialize. If a large company is on
the verge of bankruptcy, government will intervene to keep it in
business, often on anti-trust grounds. I need not remind readers of
this journal of the eyebrows that are raised whenever two airlines
announce they are considering merger.
"R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 107
(2d ed. 1967), quoted in Rasenberger, Deregulation and Local Airline Service-
An Assessment of Risks, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 843, 863 (1975).
"I GALBRAITH, supra note 9, at ch. 16.
"3 J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER 45-49 (1952).
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Third, any large organization must stabilize costs and prices if
all such organizations are to plan their output over any period of
time. This is a mutual requirement among all industries which buy
and sell from each other, and it is as much a need for employees
(salaried and wage earners) as it is for employers; unless things are
organized on the basis of a "flow principle," there can be no
yearly salaries and no labor contracts."
Because prices are stabilized over long periods, the conventional
argument is that large companies do not compete against each
other, but they do indeed compete, and fiercely, for percentage
shares of the total market. While they set "administrative" prices
to yield "target" profits (sufficient for purposes outlined above),
they allocate substantial portions of their operating budgets to ad-
vertising and promotion, excessive capacity, gimmicks or attractive
services to consumers, and meaningless product differentiation,
each dedicated to bettering the percentage market share of the
individual producer. Examples are all around us; we have many
more branch banks than we need, many more gasoline stations
than required, all sorts of "green stamp" and "premium" offers,
and such "product differentiation" approaches as that of one cereal
manufacturer who charged eighteen cents more for a twelve-ounce
box of one cereal than for another-the only difference being 0.6
cents worth of vitamins.1 The large producers, of course, are those
who dominate the advertising on prime time television, itself an
indication of the resources devoted to competition itself; each
manager must do all he can to insure his company's share of the
market does not decline. Even with all this expenditure, however,
members of an oligopoly usually achieve their "target" profits, and
these seem high to casual observers; historically, profits have
ranged between twenty and thirty-five per cent."'
If the reader retraces the above steps, it is clear how much the
scheduled airline industry conforms to the behavior of typical
oligopolies. The large city-pair markets (e.g., New York-Los
14 In classical economic theory, each producer would operate at economic
capacity (where unit cost of production equals price in the market). Large in-
dustries regulate production according to trends in sales, prices remaining sub-
stantially unchanged. G. MEANS, PRICING POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
199-205 (1962).
11 N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1972, 1, at 12, col. 4.
1 MEANS, supra note 14, at 236-44.
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Angeles) seldom have more than three or four carriers serving
them. They compete vigorously with each other, spending lavishly
on prime time television commercials. We all are familiar with
carriers advertising that the "seat in the middle is usually empty,"
thus luring passengers with an offer of extra elbow room. While
they are widely criticized for much of the competition, as by the
contributor to the symposium who ridiculed "more flights, more
planes, more frills, . . gourmet meals, and Polynesian pubs,"'"
the behavior is typical of any oligopoly, regulated or unregulated.
The regulated route structure, however, has two characteristics
which distinguish it from most unregulated industries. One is
uniquely a function of the product offered for sale. Unfilled seats
do not become part of an inventory which can be stored in the
hope customers will come along later; the inventory is destroyed
as an inherent part of the competition itself. This situation also
affects farmers producing perishable goods, hospital administrators
worrying about empty beds, warehouse proprietors concerned
about the next buyer of storage space, and truckers apprehensive
about "deadheading." The second characteristic is that scheduled
airline profits are usually meager or nonexistent, because fare regu-
lation prevents carriers from achieving the profits of unregulated
oligopolies. Keeping profits low is not the same as reducing the
costs of competition., however, and the struggle for market shares
goes on and on at enormous cost. This characteristic has an im-
portant corollary effect; airlines seldom have capital available for
research and new investment. This has an effect on safety and
training, but it also creates a crisis when it is time to replace
equipment. We approach such a crisis now, as the original jet
fleet nears the end of its life expectancy.
I find it difficult to imagine many city-pair markets which re-
quire the services of say, eight carriers. Yet, economists such as
Caves never compare the precise characteristics of unregulated
oligopolies with what might occur if airlines were deregulated.
If, as he notes, profits are high when fewer than eight sellers domi-
nate a market, it would seem logical to conclude that unregulated
city-pair markets eventually must be dominated by a few companies
17 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 610. Elsewhere, Senator Kennedy's phrasing is
"Mozart over Missouri . . . Lasagna over Los Angeles . . . piano bars and
polka-dotted planes." 122 CONG. REC. S6839 (1976).
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which would then charge the high prices typical of unregulated
oligopolies. I think there can be little doubt that the present sched-
uled airlines would charge higher fares than they do now if they
were not prevented from doing so by the regulatory process itself.
To be as fair as I can with respect to the advocates of deregulation
and more competition, however, I must deal with the argument
they make concerning this problem.
Deregulation proponents often begin by articulating a version
of a point I made earlier in this section, that it is indeed necessary
to look at individual city-pair markets. Any speech about the
merits of deregulation contains some reference to intrastate carriers
in California and Texas. Academic careers have been built on
the study of a few small airlines, and Senator Edward Kennedy
has often pointed out that "airlines in California and Texas that
are not regulated by the CAB offer fares that are thirty to fifty
percent less than those charged by CAB carriers over comparable
routes."'8 Deregulators emphasize that airlines have "no significant
scale economies ... and, in the absence of controls, relative ease
of entry and exit."'"
This approach implies that airlines need not be large organiza-
tions at all, but can and should be small organizations that do not
have routes extending beyond a single city-pair market. I have
little doubt deregulators would attempt to deny this implication,
but I suggest it is a major unarticulated premise of their position.
After all, their prime examples are small airlines which rely largely
upon individual city-pair markets (e.g., Los Angeles-San Fran-
cisco) where passengers are not seeking to travel beyond that first
destination. The arguments are usually accompanied by attacks
on the major airlines for arguing that higher prices are necessary
in high-density city-pairs in order to cross-subsidize travelers in
low density markets (e.g., Harrisburg-Peoria). The deregulators
insist that because "dense routes ... provide very little excess profit
to pay for small-town service,"2 the cross-subsidy argument can
be ignored.
I take the arguments of the deregulators to be logical absurdities
for several reasons. First, the deregulators ignore the need for
"See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. S6840 (1976).
19 Miller, supra note 2.
20 122 CONG. REC. S6842 (1976).
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connecting city-pair markets together for the sake of efficiently
moving passengers whose city-pairs overlap each other. Deregula-
tors would admit the absurdity of requiring passengers to change
both aircraft and airline at every intermediate stop but, once the
connection between markets is accepted as necessary, the city-pair
examples of California and Texas lose their validity. If any one
carrier is to operate in many city-pair markets, it becomes some-
thing other than a small operation in which "ease of entry and
exit" is possible. The airline systems we now have, complete with
computer facilities second only in magnitude to those of the U.S.
government,' are not "small" uncomplicated systems containing
only a few pilots and mechanics.
Second, it is misleading to argue that dense routes do not pro-
vide "excess profits" for small-city subsidization; where there are
no profits at all, none can be used for subsidy, but this obscures
the fact that the costs of small-community service are absorbed in
the costs of overall operations. In this connection, there can be
no satisfactory way of separating costs, even when we know there
is some separation.
Third, one of the professed objectives of the deregulators is to
achieve fares low enough to attract those "millions of Americans
who have never traveled by air because they cannot afford to."'
If these millions were attracted by substantially lower fares every-
where, every small carrier would be suddenly transformed into a
large one, and "ease of entry and exit" would no longer be possible.
My own imagination leads me to wonder what it would be like to
set up interline baggage handling systems at major airports if each
airport were suddenly to have twice as many companies operating
there as it has now.
The CAB contributes little to the discussion by its repeated in-
sistence that "wasteful service competition is an inherent feature
of the basic regulatory system."' As I have argued above, "wasteful
service competition" is inherent to any oligopoly, regulated or
unregulated. The deregulators would have us believe that more
competition would lead to the classical design of a large number
21 Lloyd-Jones, Deregulation and Its Potential Effect on Airline Operations,
41 J. AIR L. & COM. 815, 826 (1975).
"Senator Kennedy's statement in 122 CONG. REC. S6841 (1976).
13 CAB, quoted in 122 CONG. REC. S6841 (1976).
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of producers. This seems to assume that many U.S. industries
typically have "free" competition. As Galbraith correctly notes,
most major industries are dominated by a few firms, and the over-
all economy rises or falls according to the fortunes of these "bell-
weather" industries. Thus, deregulators actually argue that deregu-
lation would bring about a condition that does not now exist in un-
regulated industries. Students of microeconomics press upon us
the abstract models of classical economics which cannot be found
in unregulated sectors. Suppose for a moment, however, that we
had a classical "free" market in the airline industry, one in which
say, 100 separate airlines were engaged in all-out price competition
for the Los Angeles-New York traveling public. What might
happen?
In a perfectly competitive industry, each firm is so small that
it can ignore the effect of its output on the market price. Each
firm finds it to its advantage to increase output to the point where
marginal cost equals price and to ignore the effects of its extra
output on the overall position of the industry. This tends to vastly
increase the total output, each firm assuming (or hoping) that
other firms will pay the cost by reducing output to obtain a higher
price. Scores, perhaps hundreds, of producers vie for consumers,
each keeps lowering his price to the point where it falls below
production costs, and business failures mount. Downward price
spirals and social chaos are absolutely inevitable in the absence
of outside intervention, and no such industry survives without gov-
ernment price supports, tariffs, approved cartel agreements, sub-
sidies for nonproduction, government purchases of surpluses, and
similar actions. In those industries that most nearly approach per-
fect competition (agriculture, textiles), this cycle is a historic way
of life. More to the point here, it cannot be avoided." Once we
get into such things as tariffs and quotas, we really adopt forms
of regulation which are disguised to the point where producers,
government, and economists can pretend we have unregulated in-
dustry. It is ironic that as the demands for deregulation reach a
crescendo (1977), our most competitive industry (agriculture)
languishes in a new depression brought about by the production
" This argument is paraphrased from M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS ch. 1 (1969).
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of more food than can be sold at viable prices. Farmers march on
Washington, and the government plans to reintroduce regulation
in the form of production cutbacks.
Classical microeconomics leaves us with a peculiar intellectual
and operational contradiction. A free market is presumed to lead
to improved efficiency, but this is a definition based upon the doc-
trine that planning cannot and should not be accomplished by
anyone except individual producers and consumers. A market,
this is to say, is an unplanned system because nobody plans for
the market, only for his own situation. This amounts to saying
that the less planning we do, the greater efficiency we achieve.
This is the essence of the classical "invisible hand," but it con-
tradicts every operational definition of efficiency known to man.
Yet we remain hesitant to embrace any concept which links effici-
ency with planning, because it seems to imply the emergence of a
"collective," "socialist," or "corporate" state.
In the 1930's, for example, President Roosevelt's recovery pro-
gram initially permitted producer groups to plan a gradual increase
in output and to regulate prices, it being understood that if pro-
duction were not restrained to what the market would bear, and if
prices did not enable producers to stay in business, the downward
spiral into social chaos would resume. ' The Supreme Court rejec-
tion of this delegation of authority to trade associations was, in
effect, a declaration that production cannot be planned, a concept
that epitomizes classical economic theory. Yet the sequence of
overproduction and collapse is inevitable, except in the unlikely
situation of absolutely infinite demand, but that would only pro-
duce runaway inflation. So long as overproduction is possible, it
will occur.
The major aspects of the argument can be summarized and ex-
panded. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the members of any
oligopoly do indeed compete with each other, and fiercely, for
percentage shares of the total market, and this goes on (as it
must) whether the industry is regulated or unregulated. It follows
that shifts back and forth between regulation and deregulation
cannot substantially affect this pattern of behavior. The prices and
profits of unregulated oligopolies seem high, but they can be
IA. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL pts. I-II (1959).
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lowered only if those industries are denied the opportunity to as-
semble capital for research and expansion.
While the usual approach to public regulation is monopoly, as
in the case of power companies, there are a few regulated oligop-
olies. Radio and television are regulated by public agency, but
there is no regulation of the prices for which the industry sells its
air time, hence these escalate to unbelievable heights. The industry
is financed by advertising expenditures, and these are tax-
deductible, so there is every encouragement to spend wildly in
the attempt to improve individual market shares. In essence, the
broadcast media collectively form a giant quasi-taxing agency,
taxes being passed along to consumers as part of the market prices
they pay. Meanwhile the media themselves reap good profits while
the airlines, whose prices the CAB restrains, often lose money.
Airline prices are higher than they need be, of course, because
the airlines engage in the inherently wasteful competitive practices
of all oligopolies. Once again, contrary to the arguments of both
the CAB and its critics, these practices do not change as industries
shift back and forth between regulation and deregulation. As to
price competition and perfectly free markets, they remain the im-
possible and illogical myth of classical economics; they always have
been impossible, and they always will be. The continued attempt
to define efficiency as an absence of planning is mind-boggling,
but such are the logical contradictions we pursue.
AN AMUSING VARIATION: COMPETITIVE BIDDING
In his "introduction" to the symposium on deregulation, Roy
Pulsifer refers to the "scandals" Congressional investigations "ex-
posed" in the 1930's with respect to the actions of Hoover's Post-
master General W. F. Brown in "circumventing competitive bid-
ding."'" The CAB Special Staff on Regulatory Reform emphasizes
the need for a "low-bid contract system for the provision of small
community subsidized air service,"2 and, to use contemporary
jargon, many seek to have the CAB decide whether given bidders
are "fit, willing, and able" to perform specified services. The con-
tinued attack on the Hoover Administration and the enshrinement
2141 J. Am L. & COM. 573, 574 (1975).
27 Kennedy, supra note 6, at 604.
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of competitive bidding systems are part of the conventional wisdom
of air transport policy analysis, but neither can withstand scrutiny.
If there was a "scandal" in the 1930's, it lay in the wild accusa-
tions and disastrous policy decisions made by the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration in early 1934. Postmaster General Farley suddenly
issued an order canceling all domestic air mail contracts (the major
source of revenue in the industry's early years), charging his prede-
cessor with abetting wild stock promotions, illegally extending both
air mail contracts and routes, destroying incriminating evidence,
and acting in collusion with favored companies. The Army took
on the task of flying the mail and wrote a tragic chapter in Ameri-
can aviation. Unprepared for the job and for severe weather, ham-
pered by inexperienced pilots and planes with inadequate instru-
mentation, the Army suffered a series of accidents. The Roosevelt
Administration was forced to reverse itself and advertise for new
bids from the airlines. The charges levied at Postmaster General
Brown and the airlines never stood up, but this has not persuaded
the custodians of the conventional wisdom to take another look,
and a careful one, at their fundamental premises. 8
I use a personal experience to outline the fallacies of competitive
bidding systems. Prior to the establishment of a "rate floor" by
the CAB in 1960, the Military Air Transport Service (MATS)
awarded overseas contracts by competitive bid. I was then a mem-
ber of the MATS staff for operations in the Pacific, a substantial
percentage of it handled by civil carriers (the MATS military fleet
was oriented toward NATO). One operation put up for bids each
year was substantial enough to keep twelve to fifteen DC-7 type
aircraft fully occupied on routes from California to Tokyo, Okin-
awa, and Manila. Our task in MATS was to determine how "fit,
willing, and able" were the prospective bidders (usually eight to
ten supplemental carriers). We began with the assumption that we
were to inspect eight to ten complete airline systems, staffed with
pilots, navigators, flight attendants, mechanics, en route station
personnel, and maintenance facilities. What we discovered, of
course, was that these airline systems did not exist at all, except to
28 This history is summarized in detail and extensively documented in my AIR
TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILI-
TARY ANALYSIS ch. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY].
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the extent one of them might already be engaged on the current
year's contract and rebidding for the following year. Each bidding
company presented for our inspection a series of "contingency
agreements" showing that if that company were selected, it would
immediately assemble crews, mechanics, and aircraft. Each bidding
company had contingency leasing or contract agreements covering
for the most part the same set of crews, mechanics, and aircraft,
and the company's financial ability was, in turn, dependent upon
the award of the contract. On this basis, our "inspection" was a
sham; there was no basis for declaring any company incompetent
to perform.
The award of a contract, however, led to a form of confusion
typical of old Laurel and Hardy motion pictures. Immediately upon
receiving an award, always made very close to the specified date
for beginning operation, the successful bidder would quickly create
the airline he had promised to operate. This required hurriedly
painting over the name of the last company operating the aircraft,
hiring and refitting the crews in different uniforms, and negotiating
subcontracts with operators having ground facilities at the various
island stops. Invariably, the new operation would be sporadic for
a few weeks, and it was amusing to note that hasty repainting did
not always obscure the title of the previous operator of the aircraft.
While I did not immediately realize it, this confusion exemplified
the foolishness of competitive bidding.
We in MATS could hardly have been expected to find eight to
ten completely staffed airlines "fit, willing, and able" to begin
operations but, in the meantime, having nothing at all to do. What
small company, after all, could afford to pay eighty to one hundred
pilots, and all other necessary personnel, the going wage rate, on
the chance the company might be awarded a contract? Yet the
theory of competitive bidding led us to expect to find just that, and
we were temporarily confused when we did not. Competition, in
other words, requires and compels a terrible waste of resources if
it is to function at all. This is one reason why competition, as in
the example outlined here, is sham; with each competitor planning
to operate the same airline system, we were all engagd in a hoax.
Proponents of competitive bidding seek to use it to implement
the "classical" economic principle of "efficient allocation of re-
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sources," arguing that the "lack of price competition" leads to
"misallocation.""9 While never stated with precision, "price compe-
tition" means competition in the lowering of prices, not the raising
of prices. If prices are to be constantly lowered as the result of
competition, however, this can mean only that labor costs also
must be constantly lowered. These constitute about one-half of
airline operating costs, and, if Roy Pulsifer is correct, the pro-
ponents of deregulation assume that at least some of the economies
must be achieved through lower wages."s This, in turn, would rule
out long-term contracts with unions of highly skilled professionals
(e.g., pilots and mechanics), and would require day-to-day nego-
tiations with individual employees to determine which of them
would accept lower salaries. Logically, such a system is compatible
only with high unemployment, a situation in which a pool of un-
employed professionals makes it possible for operators to constantly
drive down prices. While I do not argue that the deregulators
knowingly favor "union busting," their proposals would have the
same effect. This aspect of the problem, which Rasenberger gently
but persuasively outlines in his essay, is ignored by those favoring
price competition."
Competitive bidding, always advocated as the prime method for
installing price competition in connection with government con-
tracts, has at least two other implications usually overlooked by
the deregulators. The first of these is the long-term connection be-
tween airlines and military preparedness, directly related to the
personal experience outlined above; the CAB's 1960 decision to
abandon competitive bidding was connected with the complex his-
tory of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Often described as
an "air merchant marine," the underlying premise of CRAF is that
many long-haul transports should be immediately available for
military operations in the event of emergency. The government's
role is to provide peacetime airlift contracts of sufficient magnitude,
and at high enough rates, to permit the carriers to outfit the aircraft
in accordance with military needs (reinforced floors, communica-
tions equipment), and also to allow for continuing modernization
"See Snow, supra note 5, at 643.
s, Pulsifer, supra note 26, at 577 n.7.
"Rasenberger, supra note 11, at 865-68.
AND NOW "THE DEREGULATORS"
of at least the portion of the total fleet designated for CRAF use. 2
In the late 1950's, when Cold War considerations seemed signifi-
cant, the government's interest was to promote the conversion of
the CRAF from piston to jet transports. This interest, of course,
runs directly counter to the objectives of the deregulators; as John
Snow put it, anything which discourages all-out price competition
leads to "visible and extreme" distortions, as when older piston
aircraft were "phased out of service after only a few years" use.'
All-out price competition leads to the cheapest possible operation,
one which simply does not permit the amassing of funds for mod-
ernization.
Before the CAB acted in 1960, small businesses (principally
supplemental carriers) had captured about ninety per cent of the
military contract market.' They operated the depreciated aircraft
then being abandoned by the larger carriers, and the latter could
not afford to underbid these small competitors. The effect of a
"rate floor" was to establish a one-price situation high enough to
attract the large carriers (with their jets) and to encourage the
purchase of still more jets equipped for military uses. With all
carriers bidding the same price, contracts were allocated on the
basis of airline commitments to further modernization and CRAF
expafision. While this is a defense-related example, the larger prob-
lem is not at all unique to defense issues. This is not to argue that
continuous modernization is always a blessing, but only to suggest
that these relationships can be ignored only at the peril of making
nonsensical policy recommendations. It is a continuing feature of
air transport policy debates that microeconomics dominates the
discussion, thus insuring that issues of technology and moderniza-
tion are always ignored.
The second implication of price competition and competitive
bidding is the effect on safety, a subject that never gets enough
attention. The symposium on deregulation had little or nothing to
say, a significant omission in view of the attention given the sub-
ject in the CAB's own special staff report. Beginning with the
judgment that "safety is most likely to suffer in such areas as
12 AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 28, at 122-128.
33 Snow, supra note 5, at 643.
"4Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Military Airlift of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4828-29 (1960).
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maintenance and training programs," the report cites evidence of
the relationships among size of carriers, marginal profits, and acci-
dents. We know, for example, that the irregular operators in busi-
ness after World War II, and the air taxis and computer carriers
in more recent years, had accident rates sufficient to justify con-
siderable apprehension.' The special staff concluded, however,
that any tendency toward deterioration in safety standards could
be offset by "intensified preventive inspection" and "high passenger
and third-party liability insurance and performance bonds."3 To
put it mildly, this seems to contradict a major thrust of the de-
regulatory effort, because an increase in inspection and insurance
requirements would make it likely that costs, and prices, would go
up instead of down.
Competitive bidding, then, is simply an attempt to institutional-
ize all-out price competition, and it cannot possibly work. Indeed,
if we ever set about calculating the ultimate costs of competitive
bidding, we will discover them to be enormous. When any con-
tractor cuts comers so as to offer the lowest possible price, he sets
in motion a train of events which we constantly see around us.
New buildings collapse, roads give way after minimal use, and
millions are spent in seeking legal determinations as to who must
pay for costly repairs and reconstruction. As in the case of the
airline manager who must waste resources to compete, each bidder
must cut as many comers as he can if he is to secure the contract.
We are not dealing with "evil" or "greedy" managers, but with
individuals trapped in an illogical system.
RELATED PROBLEMS: SUPPLEMENTAL AIRLINES AND
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS
When discussions of air transport policy occupy the public stage,
important and related problems are given little attention or none
at all; yet, a long view suggests that these problems are at the
root of the public debates. I take up the problems here, that of
the supplemental carriers (and other "nonscheduled" operators)
and that of the aircraft manufacturers. Lucile Sheppard Keyes, for
' CAB, REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY REFORM 206-22
(1975) [hereinafter cited as CAB SPECIAL STAFF REPORT].
36 Id. at 280.
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example, is approvingly identified by Roy Pulsifer as one of the
analysts who have advanced sound arguments for "more than
twenty years";" indeed, she was a consultant to the CAB's Special
Staff for Regulatory Reform. Keyes argues it is "a fact of the
highest significance that both of the major marketing innovations
in the history of the industry-air coach and charters-received
their impetus from outside the protected group."3 I suggest this is
not a fact at all, and we are overdue in identifying it for the fan-
tasy it is. To outline why this is so requires a recapitulation of
the history of supplemental carriers, not to mention the relationship
between their operations and those of the certificated carriers. It
is not coincidental that crises in regulatory policy have been closely
related to the fortunes of the supplemental carriers.
Immediately following World War II, travel demands were at
a peak, and observers predicted growth would continue unabated.
Passenger load factors on the major carriers reached eighty-nine
per cent in 1945 and seventy-one per cent in 1948."3 Convinced
that demand would continue to escalate, the CAB quickly lowered
both passenger and mail payments, and everyone seemed to be-
lieve there was room in the market for both scheduled and non-
scheduled carriers."0 Predictions did not stand up, however, travel
demand suddenly leveling off in 1947 just as the scheduled airlines
were introducing the new aircraft ordered at the end of the war
(DC-6 and Constellation). These aircraft provided both expanded
capacity and a need for load factors sufficient to cover new costs.
Financial reverses began immediately; by 1949, scheduled carriers
were losing money at the rate of twenty-two million dollars per
year." There were numerous strikes, some accidents involving the
new aircraft, and corollary temporary grounds, all confronting the
CAB with a policy crisis. It raised both passenger fares and mail
payments, the latter to higher levels than before the reductions.
The CAB, moreover, paid retroactive subsidies to spread the high
" See Pulsifer, supra note 26, at 575.
"' Keyes, A Comparison of Two Proposals for Regulatory Change, 41 J. AIR
L. & COM. 727, 744 (1975).
"J. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 383-84 (1955).
1945 CAB ANN. REP. 7-8.
" U.S. PRESIDENT'S AIR POLICY COMMISSION, SURVIVAL IN THE AIR AGE 99
(1948) [hereinafter cited as FINLET'ER REPORT].
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airline losses over a three-year period. ' In some cases the CAB
forced the major carriers to raise passenger fares when they did
not wish to do so, and, more to the point of this argument, denied
the scheduled carriers permission to experiment with air coach
operation." The overall situation led to confrontations between
the scheduled carriers and CAB Chairman James M. Landis, and
President Truman dropped him in 1948. Landis admitted later
he had been over-optimistic and that arguments with the major
companies had led to his demise."
Once the major carriers had new aircraft and travel demand
had leveled off, there was no market for the nonscheduled carriers.
By 1947, they were trying only to survive until something yet un-
forseen would enable them to prosper.' The nonscheduled indus-
try's strongest supporters later admitted that survival would have
been impossible without the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War."
Even during the immediate post-World War II period, however,
the record of the nonscheduled carriers was less praiseworthy than
analysts later made it out to be. During the early peak, we do
not know whether these carriers actually offered lower fares; there
was little in the way of records, the CAB had no control over
them, and passengers were desperate. When the Celler Subcommit-
tee of the House of Representatives investigated the entire industry
in the later 1950's, it collected considerable evidence of shabby
operations, particularly through complaints filed by the Better Busi-
ness Bureaus of such cities as Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and New York. There were reports that two-engine aircraft had
been used instead of advertised four-engine craft, that return
tickets had not been honored, that refunds had been refused, and
that advertised meals had not been provided."'
Space prohibits the spelling out of similar documentation for
42 1948 CAB ANN. REP. 1-2. CAB records indicate the payments amounted to
about $30 million.
41 Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2191-93, 2212-16
(1956) [hereinafter cited as CELLER SUBCOMM. HEARINGS].
"Air-Line Industry Investigation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 213 (1949-50).
'Frederick, American Air Cargo Development, 2 AIR AFFAIRS 93 (1947).
'House Comm. on the Judiciary, Report of the Antitrust Subcomm. Pursuant
to H. Res. 107 on Airlines, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1957).
"' CELLER SUBCOMM. HEARING, supra note 43, at 583.
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the entire period from World War II to the present Those familiar
with the recurrent controversies since that time may recall that
when the Korean War ended, the nonscheduled carriers again fell
on hard times, their situation leading to attempts to help them by
the Hoover Commission, the aforementioned Celler Subcommittee
and the Senate Small Business Committee, many of the arguments
centering on the issue of whether operations of the Military Air
Transport Service should be curtailed so as to provide contract
work for the nonscheduled carriers, the certificated carriers, or
both. The supplementals, as they were known by that time, reached
another low ebb in the early 1960's, by which time it was evident
that they depended largely upon military contracts for their sus-
tenance."8 Based in part upon a prominent accident or two, new
and more stringent regulatory legislation was enacted, including
a provision that they could not exceed average levels of operation
between 1959 and 1961. Once again, a military crisis intervened,
this time the Vietnam War, an operation which brought many of
the supplementals fully into the CRAF. This was a most significant
step, because it enabled the companies to use tacit guarantees of
unbroken Defense Department business as collateral for the pur-
chase of CRAF-equipped aircraft.
The government's support for aircraft purchases took the form
of tacit guarantees that substantial defense-related airlift contracts
would be made available for many years. One Air Force official
explained in 1962, for example, that his office was using long-term
contracts as an "incentive" to air carriers to purchase new trans-
ports, that this gave the carriers a "firmer basis for financial plans,"
and that the quantity of ongoing military business would doubtless
influence future aircraft purchases."9 He noted also that eighty per-
cent of the contracts went to small businesses, an indication that
even if the policy applied to all carriers associated with the CRAF,
it most directly helped the supplementals. The supplementals found
in the policy the first explicit long-term government encouragement
ever offered them, even if it side-stepped the question of what to
41 See tables in Am TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note
28, at 106-107.
49 Aircraft Guarantee Loan Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1962) (Testimony of
Edward J. Driscoll, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force).
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do with all such aircraft in time of peace. This encouragement led
to the involvement of large companies not usually associated with
airline operations. They bought new jet transports, then leased
them to companies having military contracts; Greyhound Corpora-
tion was one such example."0 The airline industry correctly per-
ceived the policy as a government commitment, but discovered by
1965 that it was a commitment easily withdrawn. From that time
forward, the Defense Department has awarded contracts only to
the extent that military aircraft are not available to perform the
airlift, while both scheduled and supplemental carriers have asked
for new and much firmer guarantees.1 Since the end of the Viet-
nam War, of course, it has been impossible to employ all CRAF-
designated aircraft on military contracts. But this is not the only
problem which involves what might logically be called a surplus
of available aircraft.
While seldom noticed by those who confine their analysis to the
airlines as such, the government has had a long-term interest in
assuring the economic well being of aircraft manufacturers, and
for several reasons. The Export-Import Bank, created during the
Great Depression to stimulate exports, has for years guaranteed
loans to foreign airlines for the purchase of transports built in
the United States, and our aircraft have dominated international
civil aviation since World War II. Between 1955 and 1960, fifteen
countries used twenty-five such loans to buy $173 million in air-
craft; in 1961 alone, the U.S. guaranteed loans of $94 million to
Brazil, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, India, and Japan."2 Having
acquired a vested interest in the operational success of foreign
airlines, the United States had little choice but to be generous in
awarding routes into the country. Stung by criticism that this dam-
aged United States flag carriers, the Eisenhower administration
defended one such sale on grounds that the Dutch were the largest
5 TIME, Apr. 26, 1963, at 82-83.
" The Posture of Military Airiift: Hearings Before the Research and Develop-
ment Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
112-118 (1975). (Testimony of Edward J. Driscoll, then president of the National
Air Carrier Association, the trade group representing supplemental carriers).
" Compiled from FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON NATIONAL AVIATION GOALS: PROJECT HORIZON 30 (1961); Aviation
Daily, Aug. 11, 1961; AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE UNITED
STATES PROGRAM OF AVIATION ASSISTANCE TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, RE-
PORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, Appendices A-1 to A-14 (1964).
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single purchaser of United States transports and that the route
awards were necessary to protect the interests of American manu-
facturers."
A second and stronger reason was the presumed necessity to
maintain a healthy aircraft industry as a mobilization base for any
future emergency. This was the central thrust of the major policy
groups which set the United States course after World War II, the
Congressional Aviation Policy Board (Brewster Board) and the
President's Air Policy Commission (Finletter Commission).' The
long-term impact of this approach has been so far-reaching as to
almost defy comprehension. When other countries buy United
States aircraft, the condition for securing a United States loan
guarantee is that funds be not otherwise obtainable, a direct en-
couragement to grant loans that banks in those countries refuse
to make. With countries such as France, Japan, and the Nether-
lands involved, the outcome could only be a sales program geared
to the needs of manufacturers to keep producing rather than the
needs of air travelers. Add to this the desire of developing coun-
tries to operate their own international airlines as a badge of na-
tional prestige, and the problem worsens. Add still further the
expansion of the Military Air Transport Service through the pur-
chase of standard air transport aircraft (e.g., DC-6 or Constella-
tion), and add also the social unrest that might follow if a large
aircraft manufacturer went out of business, (e.g., McDonnell-
Douglas or Lockheed). The result is that the United States created
not only a large network of scheduled foreign airlines which
threatened the livelihood of United States flag carriers, but an
international and military network of nonscheduled airlines as well.
The U.S. government can be said to have a more direct interest
in the financial viability of foreign and supplemental carriers than
it has in the health of the certificated carriers. This is because
government involvement is tied directly to particular aircraft
financed through Export-Import Bank guaranteed loans or De-
fense Department "commitments" to specific amounts of contract
airlift. The granting of a route certification to a scheduled carrier,
conversely, is much more generalized, because the route award
"a DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 10 12-13 (1957).
54 S. REP. No. 949, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1951); FINLETTER REPORT,
supra note 41, at 69.
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implies very little about the precise number of aircraft that should
be bought and used. If a foreign or supplemental carrier defaults,
government agencies can, at least in part, be blamed; if a scheduled
carrier defaults, only the carrier is at fault. I remain amazed that
the issue of government promotion of aircraft sales, so obviously
significant to any comprehensive analysis of air transport policy,
is seldom mentioned by those who debate and make that policy.
The CAB Special Staff Report had nothing to say on the subject,
nor did the symposium published in this Journal. Yet it remains
reasonable to suggest that an underlying reason for Presidential
and congressional advocacy of deregulation is, once again, the
necessity of finding markets for the many transports purchased
through government incentives, perhaps many more than should
have been built. Once again, we face the old question; where do
we go from here?
A NEW RATIONALE FOR A "PUBLIC UTILITY" APPROACH
Beginning with my 1965 book and, later in several articles,"
I have argued consistently for something of a "public utility," or
"natural monopoly" approach to airline regulation, and on a global
scale at that." These arguments, I think, were valid then, but they
now take on an urgency greater than most of us could have fore-
seen until recent years. Because an emphasis on more competition
and lower prices must always mean an increase in total output, as
Senator Kennedy reminds us in his pleas that airline travel be
made available to those who cannot afford it now, it becomes
logically absurd to advocate both a substantial increase in airline
operation and the conservation of very limited fuel supplies. From
my perspective, it is no longer important whether readers agree
with this concluding argument, because some kind of global public
utility system is inevitable within a few years, solely because of the
need to reduce airline operations to conserve fuel. Whatever the
shape of that system, it will be a planned system, hence will not re-
semble the jumbled system we have now. It must become less com-
petitive, not more competitive, and the initial effort will resemble a
"See, e.g., Air Transport Policy: A Crisis in Theory and Practice, 36 J. AIR
L. & COM. 661-72 (1970).
-" International Air Transport: A Microsystem in Need of New Approaches,
25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 875-98 (1971).
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cartel. Individual carriers, domestic and international, may retain
their identities, but the system as a whole doubtless will be a pool-
ing arrangement.
Much of the evidence for this revised argument is accepted to
some extent by those involved in the contemporary deregulatory
effort; while they present the evidence, they ignore it when they
turn to making recommendations. The CAB Special Staff Report,
for example, acknowledges that recent increases in the fare level
are traceable to general inflation, an extraordinary rise in the cost
of fuel, and a drop in the average real wage, the latter making it
more and more difficult for individuals to fly."7 There is no reason
to assume these factors would have any less effect on an unregu-
lated industry.
I do not pursue here a traditional argument for "natural monop-
oly." One aspect of the traditional argument, that costs of entry
are so high in some industries as to make competition inefficient
(as in the image of three power companies offering complete serv-
ices on the same city block), seems applicable to the airlines. If
one looks at the experience, global commuter systems, multiple
route structures, and various maintenance facilities necessary to
some of the large airline operations that must remain necessary in
any overall airline system, it seems illogical to suggest that such
entities as Pan American, Trans World, and even Allegheny can
be created and recreated overnight. It is possible, however, to
imagine a one-aircraft airline operating in a single city-pair market,
and, as I have suggested, a part of the deregulatory argument is
linked to that image. I argue instead for a "natural monopoly"
approach which follows from the inherent logic of any competitive
system. Even if only two airlines compete for the same city-pair
travelers, the production of empty seats must inevitably escalate.
One of the ironies of our time is that Ralph Nader, a long-time
advocate of more competition among airlines, simultaneously
argues for more regulation of hospital construction because non-
regulation has led to massive overproduction of beds and unjusti-
fiable price increases." I agree with the Ralph Nader who analyzes
hospitals, not the Ralph Nader who analyzes airlines.
51 CAB SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 6.
S8 B. ENSMINGER, THE $8 BILLION HOSPITAL BED OVERRUN: A CONSUMER'S
GUIDE TO STOPPING WASTEFUL CONSTRUCTION (1975).
1977]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The subject of public regulation has, I think, been subject to
extraordinarily distorted arguments over the years. Regulatory
agencies, including the CAB, usually are attacked as being cap-
tives of the industries they regulate, headed by incompetents, and
deserving only of abolition." This argument consistently overlooks
abundant evidence that the record of regulated industries is far
superior to that of the unregulated sector. Where recognized
"natural monopolies" are concerned, costs have steadily declined
for years despite generally upward cost trends in all other sectors."'
Even the CAB Special Staff Report acknowledges as much, point-
ing out that before recent increases due to inflation and fuel, both
electric power companies and the airlines had experienced "de-
creasing real prices over a span of many years."" This can only
mean that regulation has been more effective in holding down
prices than the unregulated economy at large. The only exception
cited by deregulators is the mythical "free market" which does not
really exist anywhere; is it not significant that deregulators never
cite a single industry as an example of what they seek for air
transportation? The record of regulated industries, then, totally
refutes the criticism of regulatory agencies. This does not mean we
have a perfect relationship between such agencies and the indus-
tries they regulate, only that the results are better than in unregu-
lated industries.
Our fear of monopoly, in this case by city-pair market, also is
based on a central misunderstanding of the fundamental problem.
Traditional opposition to the monopoly is based less on the planning
aspects of monopoly than on the fear of the monopolist's unilateral
authority to restrict output, set prices so as to maximize profits,
then sell his output to whomever he chooses. We have sought to
51 The literature on this subject is enormous. See, e.g., Can Regulatory Agen-
cies Protect Consumers?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH ch. 1 (1971), in which George J. Stigler outlines the deficiencies in
regulation in contrast to the "known" benefits of consumer sovereignty and com-
petition. See also R. NOLL, REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL
PROPOSALS ch. 11 (1971), in which regulation is condemned as "expensive, in-
effective, and even anticompetitive."
"'Posner, "Natural Monopoly and its Regulation," quoted in THE CRISIS OF
THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 34-38 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970). This trend doubt-
less has been reversed due to recently rising fuel costs, but the relative relation-
ship remains unchanged.
61 CAB SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
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transfer this authority to the consumer, so as to make sure pro-
ducers must respond to his "demands." If the consumer is to have
a choice, however, there must be available to him at the time of
each and every purchase more versions of a given product than
he wants, needs, or can possibly use. Thus, the drive for deregula-
tion and stringent antitrust enforcement always emphasizes a vast
increase in supply over demand, as in Senator Kennedy's pleas for
substantial expansion of passenger travel. It would be far better
to rely on other methods of diffusing monopoly authority, public
regulation being the only design currently available. Galbraith,
hardly a staunch conservative, but one who understands organiza-
tions better than do other economists, compares the positive re-
sults we have attained through the planning of communications
systems via A.T. & T. and public regulation and the terrible results
in transportation of all sorts via insufficient or no regulation and
planning.' There is little doubt that CAB regulation has been less
effective than it might be, but for reasons beyond CAB control.
Faced from the beginning with contradictory objectives traceable
to the political turmoil of the 1930's and the refusal to give the
Hoover Administration credit for anything, the regulatory process
has been extraordinarily expensive because of the necessity to con-
sider competing applications for new routes. When two or more
carriers apply for a route award, there can be no sensible way to
decide among them, yet the attempt must be made. Volumes of
testimony emerge, everyone spends millions, but no sensible deci-
sion is possible except the one that cannot be made-a city-pair
monopoly. Nor do the airlines have a choice, either; contrary to
Senator Kennedy's claim that airlines are not compelled to seek
new certifications and waste funds seeking them, managers know
they will be fired if they do not stay even with competitors. The
CAB, because it must install competition on many routes, has been
unable to control the costs of competition and hence has been
prevented from setting the lowest efficient price. Further, even
though airline managers often recognize the need for some sort of
"public utility" approach, 3 they cannot advocate an end to direct
competition because they might be accused of damaging the in-
6 2 GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 360-63 (2d ed. 1971).
3 Donald J. Lloyd-Jones uses this argument, supra note 21, at 815-42.
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terests of their shareholders. Even the consumer interest would be
better advanced in a revised regulatory system. Relieved of the
necessity to decide among competing applicants, the CAB would
focus on better service to customers primarily by comparing the
operations of airlines operating on different routes. The overall
record of monopoly utility regulation is fairly encouraging in this
regard.
A revised system of regulation, then, must not only begin with
acceptance of a monopoly city-pair principle, but also with an
understanding of what we have created. The ultimate regulatory
system, domestic and international, will have no choice but to
retire many aircraft from service, despite the unwillingness of
government agencies to admit that sales promotion has been over-
done. While this was done wtih good intentions (recovery from
depression, helping allies, expanding air travel, supporting war
efforts), the present drive for deregulation is clearly an attempt to
find contemporary markets for more aircraft than can be used.
Given the current situation, supplemental carriers are correct when
they accuse the scheduled carriers of "predatory competition," and
the scheduled carriers are just as correct when, they mention "cream
skimming." With the imperatives that face us, however, some larger
settlement of the dispute cannot be avoided."
It is time to recognize that the overall record of airline regula-
tion is much better than is usually pictured by its critics. Aside
from the CAB's fare record, better than that of unregulated indus-
tries, but damaged because of an inability to prevent competition,
the airline system remains a vast improvement over its predecessor
-the railroads. Some readers may recall the assertion of one presi-
dent of the New York Central Railroad that "a pig can travel from
coast-to-coast in the same railroad car, but the passenger cannot!"
Without the initial intervention of the Hoover Administration, it
is possible that transcontinental passengers might still be changing
airlines in Kansas City or Chicago. While we are prone to believe
that advances in technology determine such outcomes, regulatory
4Interestingly, the wider settlement will resemble the actions of Hoover's
Postmaster General. Because the present global system is based substantially upon
U. S. government actions (route certifications, points of entry for foreign carriers,
guaranteed loans, long-term military contracts), an equitable settlement will be
difficult to achieve, but it must be done because of the government's responsibility.
General Brown will be vindicated yet.
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policy is more important. At any rate, the only question before us
is what form the planning system takes; deregulation, or the ab-
sence of planning, simply is impossible to sustain. There is no
fuel.w
6 The fuel problem "solves," if that is the appropriate word, the long-term
problem of the supplemental carriers. They really have been (in disguise) the
"air merchant marine" that has seemed so necessary for meeting military emer-
gencies. Some of those who study the international aspects of air transport policy
acknowledge that "redundancy" is built into airline policy on occasion just to meet
such needs. R. THORNTON, INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES AND POLITICS 80-87 (1970).
Redundancy, of course, means that some aircraft are not needed when there are
no emergencies. Given the fuel crisis, however, a larger conclusion suggests itself.
For practical purposes, the U. S. can no longer fight a sustained conventional
war, because the fuel for tanks, planes, and ships is not available. Had, we not
withdrawn from Vietnam when we did, the oil crisis of 1973-74 would have com-
pelled us to withdraw anyway. We now face a future in which the only type of
war available to us (except for insignificant skirmishes) is strategic nuclear war.
This is argued at greater length in my Proliferation and the Future: Destruction
or Transformation?, 430 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 133-46 (1977). This leaves no requirement for the CRAF
and none for the supplementals, but again, the future system must incorporate
all present members and then allocate the cutbacks.
A small example of what must occur is the CAB's approval for Trans World
Airline to reduce its coach fare between Chicago and Los Angeles by 37% while
reducing the number of daily flights from five to two, as of Sept., 1977. This was
not explicitly connected with any attempt to conserve fuel, but to reduce over-
capacity in a city-pair market experiencing ragged growth. The action makes
sense from the perspectives argued herein. Chicago-Los Angeles Super Coach
Proposal by TWA, CAB Order No. 77-7-29 (July 11, 1977).
By early 1978, unfortunately, more liberal CAB charter rules (including
CAB promotion of widespread international price wars), together with a belief
on the part of the certificated carriers that drastic reductions in fares might en-
courage Congress not to pass deregulation legislation, was leading to the equiva-
lent of old-fashioned gasoline price wars (always disastrous to gasoline dealers).
There was little doubt that some surge in airline travel would result, but there
also could be little doubt that airlines could not uniformly stay with such low
fares and remain financially healthy. It seemed likely that when fares were once
again raised (either by a CAB seeking to avoid the need for subsidy payments,
or by the remaining dominant carriers in an unregulated oligopoly), the pattern
would be similar to that following World War II; the revised fares ultimately
would be considerably higher than before the 1978 price war.

